Was Bay the Beginning of the End?

Team Members,

I do Believe we're almost to the point where sane minds can only blame the masses for Nortel's failings, namely all and any who assert that:
"It started 3 years ago, it started 5 years, 10 years... under Roth, under Dunn... something happened with Bay, then this, and also that... don't forget issue 'X' in 1997..."

Execs and CEOs came and went, secular bears and bulls came and went, acquisitions and sales were made, times were good, times were bad. Our customres were always right.
The only constant throughout Nortel's colored history (no offences, 'homies') has been its many employees who have consistently failed to produce any lasting Value with the tools and resources provided them in any given scenario, under any management, on any continent (cost-effective Asia excepted)

In bull times, employees sat around playing Windows Poker and Solitaire, with the NT stock ticker running high in the toolbar. The current bear had them gambling on NT stock, sitting in increasing solitude, staring out windows, complaining about the bull from above, standing at the bar, feeling like a tool.

I had no other choice than to follow suit, which I am receiving in the form of law. Unfair. I'm feeling your pain as best I can. But I did read the fine print on my contract and therefore can't really lose.
Maybe in your next career you'll do have learned from me to better leverage your talents and skills as you sign your your WalMart greeter contract, modified to collect the $mio for a job well done.

I feel ya, I'll see ya wouldnt want to be ya (and will most certainly never have to greet ya),

Mike Z

Succession was originally the branding of DMS-100 evolution into packet telephony. This was strictly a Carrier initiative at the outset (not even an SL-100 variant). The Enteprise VoIP programs were running in parallel, but they were not branded Succession until much later... not long before Succession as a brand was dropped entirely.

The Carrier side of Nortel (both the Carrier and Broadband LOBs) had "ATM on the brain" and were missing the significance of IP. Of course, it's true that Nortel had been very successful in exploiting ATM with Passport and Sonet products; however, Nortel rode that train too far. Even with the acquisition of Bay and the formation of the Carrier Packet LOB, Nortel fumbled badly in Carrier IP (Juniper, Avici, the ill-fated Versalar 25000 from Bay, and finally the ill-fated optical bfr).

Nortel's failure to see IP and capitalize on it was not unique. Despite its success
in data technologies like X.25, the company essentially missed the LAN market and compounded its error by missing the IP market too. Remember when there were Cisco products all across Nortel?

By the late 1990s, Bell Canada's network operations people had already concluded that a tight relationship with Nortel was no longer essential to Bell Canada's future. Nortel had similarly concluded that driving its product line based mainly on Bell Canada's requirements didn't make sense, either. Bell was astute in noticing that Nortel was veering off course... Bell got cozy with Cisco early on.

That mirrors almost exactly what I saw south of the border. messing with the patchwork of countless network islands, humming "Baba O'Riley" - you know - "teenage wasteLAN"

One notable point that was glossed over at the time is that until the Bay acquisition, Nortel was majority owned by BCE (essentially Bell Canada). The Bay purchase substantial diluted BCE ownership (and created a large number of US shareholders many of whom would never have heard Nortel previously).

I suspect this was a significant part of Roth's thinking. He wanted to run a 'real' company not just a subsidiary. As 'CEO' of Nortel he continued to be subordinate to the CEO of BCE.

The historical relation between Bell and Nortel made less and less sense by the mid-90s. Bell was hampered in its operations and Bell was certainly not large enough to support Nortel.

Unfortunately, Nortel and Bell had an agreement where if Bell wanted something, Nortel could make it and Bell would have to buy it. So Nortel would make things not because doing so made business sense but 'strategically' to avoid a competitor getting into Bell.

This 'business' culture continues to this day. If its telecom, Nortel believes it should build it. It doesn't matter whether it makes money or not.

The stock dilution was a step towards independence - a bit like a teenage Nortel getting its drivers license. BCE's later divestiture was Nortel leaving home. The late 90s boom was the party after moving out, followed of course by failing out university and now in the hospital sick from all the partying. :(

So one can trace Nortel's end even further back. Nortel simply never learned to be a real company.

I think the divorce between BCE and Nortel was required by the WTO.

I hadn't heard that but I do strongly believe it was in both companies' strategic interest regardless.

It is sad that Nortel didn't survive it:(

I remember the controversy well as well as the testimony. I could not find the ultimate article, but here is a link to the testimony http://www.archive.org/stream/foreigngovernmen0...

Not long after the breakup began. I think a lot of Nortel never recovered from being a monopoly (especially in Canada)

Interesting link.

I also remember shortly afterward Nortel did get US trade support (sorry can't find a link). This was shortly after Lucent got a multi-billion dollar Saudi telecom contract essentially as a precondition to getting F-16s. (Showing how valuable that can be.)

By by the 90s Bell Canada simply could not support Nortel. The model was unsustainable. Unfortunately it was too ingrained in Nortel's corporate culture.

Overpriced is relative. Also, when you can print paper to buy a company, it makes the impossible possible. The truth behind the bubble in the late 90s is it was a ponzi scheme. Just like the current collapsing bubble is/was a ponzi scheme.

Mark - what do you define as the deal 'working' ? Enterprise made over $1B in revenue just selling Bay products for years. Given that it was a bubble valuation to begin with and all Nortel had to do was print paper to do it, I'd say the Bay acquisition was the best of the bunch that Nortel tried. Shasta, Xros and the others failed miserably because they had no products that actually produced any sustained revenue or took market share.

Beh. The sad truth is that the Nortel-Bay merger was more successful than the Wellfleet-Synoptics merger. Of course this is not saying much, but nortel inherited serious problems with a east coast Wellfleet and a west coast Synoptics whose products did not work well together and people that flat out did not get along. I do think BayRS was and is superior to Cisco IOS though.

The reason for the aquisition as I understood it ,was that Bay had a presence in a lot of places that Nortel did not (Lucent was a Bay reseller), so the acquisition's main objective was for market share/channel, not some grand merger of technologies.

Poorly executed by John (I walk on water) Roth and his minions. Roth was an optical weenie. If it was not optical he really didn't care. Of course the supreme irony was that optical was what undid nortel. Boneheads like Roth and Munford were forecasting optical demand through the roof and completely failed to see the advances in technology that allowed more capacity on the same equipment. Sales and financial folks like Chandran and Dunn failed to talk to their customer counterparts and did not see that optical demand was falling off a cliff..

Fiddling while Rome burned. Roth took his hundred million and left. The Dunnster took over and tried to run it BaU. Fait accompli.

BTW the Dunnster was Roth's CFO, where do you think those accounting problems began?

$20B wasted during the bubble era is big money as they went down to 1/3rd their size and sales. I question if it was bad acquisitions or Roth envy that got the better of them thereafter.

They use to dilute a whopping 100M shares a year they said was to "keep good people" to get an idea of the massive cash burn.

Before almost all of their earnings (80-90% EXT) took a steep nosedive (CDMA), they had under $2B cash in Q206, they went on to print $2B in 10%+ paper to pay creditors at around 4% who increased cash collateral requirements from 1 to 1.5B after the largest fraud in Canada was followed by revisions that doubled estimates, even for further periods that wiped out Q205's supposed triple profits, printed another whopping $2B in dilutive notes creatively, moved money into Q406 to make 2006's numbers before the lenient SEC finally stepped in years later to monitor repair... and before they downplayed folding to fold so soon thereafter.

Furthermore, they got money from headquarters ($100M) , they got Flex money with endless hush hush amendments(3-500M?), sold UMTS,3G ($300M) while aspiring for 4G like the fox jumping for grapes fable to derisk LTE like WiMax... etc, Like where has all the money gone as they can't sell depreciated and rapidly depreciating assets today?!

Costs for SGA, exorbitant pay practices with a CEO who makes more than BCE's like the OSC head makes a multiple of the SEC's, EDC loans, bonuses in crazy levels, JVs with money locked up,huge R&D, fruitless acquisitions with ongoing buying losing revenues, higher interest rates to print paper and sell assets as they reward cost cuts, etc,,,, costs craze giving product away, worse yet, paying customers to take it by losing money.

They even ironically trade options to cash again recently. Worse yet, creditors wanted to see a plan before they approved even more bonuses after bankruptcy.

well... thankyou and now we know for what... unable to pay severances as pensions tanked. They don't speculate on the media who they keep mentioning but gag employees to speaking with then since downplaying bankruptcy to say thanks. Why didn't they say thanks for trying like a casino to shareholders. Heck even their past Hungle got nailed for bad trading as this CEO leads by example legally with 20 buck buying opportunities.

From a culture of rewarding innovation to one of rewarding financial innovations, they even print bonuses into bankruptcy...amazing...

Happy talk all along... hype to contradiction... all bone us driven /lies makes them look like even those not at the crime scene are tyrants with so many still there, keeping fraud bonuses to boot

The culture was not right in the head, something was severely wrong with conservative tunnel vision pigs at the trough from a dream team to a green team

What changed once the koolaid was tainted. Private jets and caviar forever paid by selling assets, to look big and fall faster when the well runs dry. Sounds nuts to me.

They overpaid even more for acquisition thereafter:
-35% premium for Bay
-over 100% for PEC given it was worth less than half so shortly thereafter
-10X premium for Tasman
they even paid a premium a fist time CEO

Only 5 lines?

Are you felling good?

:-)

he is readable now :)

it's the Cliff Notes version of his previous monologue.

but good 5 lines; proto into quality now, which is a good thing :)...--bb

Strategy requires execution. One cannot exist without the other. So if the strategy was right, the execution must be at the heart of the issue. One could question the strategy, but it is clear IP networks are here.

The Bay acquisition was used by the machiavellian Roth yes-men, who were clever political operators (but incompetent business operators) to purge most of the competent management on both the Nortel and Bay sides of the company.

This, IMHO, was the primary cause of the demise of Nortel. The Bay acquisition allowed Roth's incompetent cronies to gain control of the company, and thus, the right-angle-turn, which in theory was a good idea, ended up being a right angle turn into the ditch from which Nortel never recovered.

Right Angle Turn = RAT and his strategy did work for him. He and his buddies bailed out like RATs just before it went over into the ditch.

Bay was #2 after Cisco in routing. Nortel just did not know what to do with it and the execs were ignorant if not arrogant to figure out what to do with it. Rst is history.

This was a good move if it had worked out differently. But the turning point was when they started buying all the junk that did not align. Clarify, Alteon, Shasta. Nortel lost focus and that was the beginning of the end.

There is a reason why some companies make their acquisitions successful. Its called smarts which nortel did not have - and I am not talking about the engineering folks. just pure unadulterated dumb management.

I hope each one of these duds get asked in their future interviews - so how did you build your business? how quickly did you demolish it? how much money did you waste on futile products? we'd like to offer you a job - noooot

Agreed. Bay gave Nortel a chance to be THE PLAYER in a new found market. Nortel did not execute. The Nortel management moved at snails pace and thought like OTG's, not fast, flexible, and agile data guys. As VoIP played out, the data guys won the political battles in customers, not the telecomm guys. By this point in time, Nortel had done nothing to up the anty for Bay technology and the whole message and opportunity was lost in the shuffle!!

If one goes back to Bay and comes forward, here's what happened:
1) Bay had great tech but poor marketing. Customers were questioning the long term staying power of Bay but loved their products.
2) Dave House came onboard and brough with him a whole bunch of cronies, along with several Dave's.
3) Under House, they instituted a change of culture with Bay Basics (from Intel) to get everyone on some common ground and organized a bit and had all these poorly executed marketing campaigns.
4) With some changes, they fattened it all up and sold it to Nortel, calling it a merger to the employees even though it was an acquisition.
5) The Daves and their cronies left soon thereafter, usually with the excuse of "spending time with family" after filling their pockets with money. Some of them ended up at startups with 2 weeks of their departures. Surprise!
6) Once Nortel took over, they gradually loaded the managment with a lot of Nortel lifers who knew nothing about the enterprise business. Mostly they were phone people who brought the Nortel flavor to things with a 5 year product perspective in a 1.5 year product cycle business. Didn't meld too well.
7) John Roth filled his pockets thereafter and retired after showing very poor leadership. He left with a million dollar annual pension.
8) The crooks (Dunn and company) took over and cooked the books, also loading their pockets with money in the process until caught.
9) Bill Owens was brought onboard to help regain some confidence in the company and to get the finances back in order and left with a lot of bucks and a promise of much more (which is part of the creditor's claims now).
10) Z and company took over, loaded the management with their GE cronies and put in place a lot of processes and such but never looked under the covers to make anything really consistent. They did their form of the GE dance, barked out orders, refused to listen to anyone underneath since they knew it all, and marched things onto the ruin it is today. And they all filled their pockets with money in the process.
11) When things finally got horribly bad, the Zsters pushed to Chapter 11 and have since laid out the bonus plan for themselves and the top tier based on cutting costs, meaning dump and screw the employees so they get more bonus money.

The employee surveys consistently indicated no confidence in the management direction and they finally came back and said to get with the program or get out, in so many words. They really didn't want to improve things except through their ivory tower view and ran things by intimidation, not by examination and improvement. They wanted to put things in place and run a tech environment like it was a widget factory.

And the marketing has still been pretty poor, although better than it was under Bay and House's rule.

And they'll run it into the ground and still fill their pockets with money.

These guys are unreal in their behavior, but sadly, very real in the outcome.

A lot of good people have worked very hard at Nortel to make really good products. The customers have recognized this and continue to select Nortel products in spite of all the shenanigans of these guys. Much of the success has been in spite of the GEniouses and not as a result of their presence and (lack of) leadership.

If I left out a detail here and there, I apologize. There have been a lot of changes over a very long period of time, more than 10 years.

rj,

Very good sumarry and the net-net is still lack of execution...--bb

thats why I said that successful companies that acquire other firms have smarts. in each of nortels acquisitions the core people disappeared after cashing out. thats who nortel paid for the stupid morons.

but if there is one common story across this it is cronyism.

"On Jun. 15, 1998, Northern Telecom Ltd. (NT) agreed to buy Bay Networks Inc. (BAY) for US$9.1 billion in stock. swapping 0.6 shares for each Bay share outstanding. Based on Nortels closing price of $63.69 at the time, Nortel would be paying $38.21 a share, a 35 percent premium.

( Bay got duped too -Nortel stock tanked thereafter )
_________________________________________________________

Nortel over-paid on everything from Bay Networks to PEC Tasman ....to their CEO and bonuses, etc...

You'd think they'd learn but the premiums they paid on acquisitions only got worse. Bay (+35%), PEC (+100%) Tasman (+1000%)... albeit decreased in size as did Nortel They paid $448M for PEC worth less than half ($220M) so shortly thereafter let alone now, and around 10 times more than Tasman was worth!.

Struggled to build revenues but with losing earnings! An idiot can give away product for free, worse yet pay them to take it.

Then rewarded any results towards any right direction cutting costs /financial innovation with high interest, etc, neglecting the big picture of inevitable outcome..Fed happy talk and always downplaying after so many disgraced forecasts ...so what ever went wrong, only catalyzed.

Perhaps the Bay Networks was only one of many examples that got the ball rolling, as part of the whopping $20B they spent in acquisitions during the bubble. Money that would have come in handy even if just diluted and left it sitting in the bank. Look what $20B could have done for them today... maybe they are right in that this is what started their death spiral that catalyzed into today's bankruptcy.

Perhaps migrating from innovation driven to bonus driven was the greater problem as a past VP said =) I bet even the Roth envy keystone juniors sigh and pine at the very thought of a whopping $20 billion eluding them today if only hindsight wasn't so easy =)

Even today, around half their total cash is unavailable /locked up ..in off shore JV's generating no substantial returns, not unlike PEC or any of their other
tanked acquisitions.

Bay Networks ALSO designed Internet-working solutions that provide a migration without a wholesale replacement of existing equipment. (40G deja vous? =)

Avatars and Microsofts UC wouldn't save the day anymore than cornering 3rd world railway markets, apartment building, tribes in malls, Chapleau think tanks, libraries, golf courses, casinos, etc... announcing anything they can like orders in a declining switches market today...downplaying... always hope to horror with these guys

Not a healthy company but dead now. Bay Networks might have been their first nail in their coffin....of many... and a well worth point take as the first strike... the beginning to their end.

Nortel has renewed contract for 3 yrs with one of the international airport in india.
This is the testimony that the customers are still supporting us for the work that we have put in and still have failth in Nortel.

It's certainly not for our language skills.

Not ur fault ... it happens I understand ur pain ;-)

Even though I am not or have never been a fan of big acquisitions Roth did the right thing to acquire a large presence in the then-exploding data market. The problem was not the acquisition itself but the execution part – the merging of the two into a single cohesive entity - and that falls squarely on the shoulders of NT’s Bell Heads that had zero vision and less-then-zero-respect for this new, unstable and unreliable IP-thing. It was a major culture clash. Net-net on Roth: Vision –Yes, Execution – No!

Yeah Think?

Bay, same speaking as "bad lucky" in Chinese. If Jonh or canadians knew this, they would avoid big mistake.

So much talk about "death" and dying.... Regardless of what happens, what happened in the past is still in the past. There is a strong "heart" remaining within the company, beating feverishly to keep the organism alive.

Any viable information to share on the life expectancy of the Enterprise business?

NT is a profitable company nowadays, and the creditors know this. So they filed Chap 11 only for to layoff thousands without paying any money.

Result is this,
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/Business/Nortel+Ne...

holy crack, did yo see this at the end?
"Nortel disclosed in the filing that it generated $2 billion in bankruptcy-related liabilities during the six-week period."

The cash reserves are increased by 122 M$(for 1.5 months)~100M$ for 1 month. In a year it will be 1.2 B$ and 2.4B$ for 2 years only for US market.

Don't miss one point! All those are only liabilities, but needn't to be paid within the Ch11 process. I think this process will extend a few years. Nortel will take some supremacy to its competitors too. Because it can generate the same or higher revenue but also able to cut costs more effectively than the other vendors. NT takes court, board, creditors, government behind. Remind United Airlines similar Ch11 process.

Bay was dying before NT bought them. NT just added to the distraction of not knowing what the market needed and how to execute to get there.

It was because of the same bone headed decision making that resulted in ignoring the need for a usable command line in the Welfleet routers so these up start INTERNET Service Providers could manage them. ISP?... "they'll never amout to much revenue"... "our focus is the enterprise".... those words still echo on Federal Sq in Billerica... idiots.

It's Federal Street, and "Wellfleet" hasn't been on Federal Street since 1996 (prior to Nortel).

It boils down to poor acquisition strategy. The acquired should have been made to conform to a standard set of operability requirements (CLI being one) at the on-set. For every customer complaining about the CLI, there is another complaining about wanting a GUI. There is no right answer to this one.

Nortel and Bay Networks played nice and didn't force these types of operational enhancements. Therefore the company turns into more of a distributor of independent product lines. Nothing plays together, there is no technology for success strategy.

Duh... and yes BAYNETWORK WAS on Federal after 1996.... Wellfleet is the reference to the routers running GAME. AND Cisco didn't get 95% of the market share of routers with millions of them deployed because they gave a crap about GUIs and Enterprise.

They saw the potential of terminating every type of high speed/low speed FR, Leased Line, Internet pipe from a service provider and in doing so drive enterprises into use their gear for their intranets.

And having been involved with the AN / Cisco 2k CLI war I can tell you THAT is why we loast the router war AND lost huge market share and revenue growth.

Further more... the knuckleheads in PLM also shot down a Channelized DS-3 for the BLN that was necessary for terminating FR and Leased line connections into UUNet. That lame mistake cost AOL / UUNet / MFS and other ISP business and let the door open for the Cisco 7500 and their damn Jaguar channelized card.

And the "made to conform" stuff... get a load of yourself.... Bay atleast was generating $500k per employee, even in a down turn in revenue, doing it their way. The result of little "conforming" they did was to blend into the beaucrats of Ottawa and drive the earnings per employee to $300k.... and looky where that has gotten us......

How Nortel integrated Bay Networks into the business was far more the problem than the acquisition itself. If we look at Cisco during similar time periods, they acquired Kalpana and Crescendo to create their Catalyst Ethernet Switch family. They acquired Stratacom for ATM & Optical and Celcius for their IP PBX (AVVID).

Comparing how the two companies did the integration of the people, technology, products and sales models proves out a world of difference.

This highlights another root cause of Nortel’s demise. Sales and Marketing did not understand or were too lazy to research what customers needed and where the industry was heading (for all BU's). The other more insidious root cause that buried us as we all know ad nauseum- Executive Management setting up their own empires rather than looking out for company interests.

This is an overly-simplistic view.

The reality is, Nortel FAILED to anticipate the impact of the TCP/IP protocol to it's core business in telephony and the PBX market.

Some of you might remember John Roth's reference to "The Right-Angle Turn"...that is, a late and hard-right turn to integrate TCP/IP capabilities into the telephony and PBX lines.

The phrase speaks for itself: it HAD to be a "Right-Angle Turn" because Upper Management had MISSED the last train to IP-Land. Thus, the late and over-priced buy-out of Bay Networks.

Bay Networks itself brought a lot of good people and intellectual property to Nortel. And it rapidly injected IP know-how into Nortel.

It was AFTER the Bay Networks buy-out that Cisco announced AVVID and that it would move into the VoIP market. They saw the opportunity that NORTEL OWNED AND SHOULD HAVE KEPT. We did not. They executed. We did not.

The seeds for Nortel's end were already sown before the Bay Networks buy-out.

MC

In fact, just months before Nortel bought Bay, the Meridian PLM still was spending millions in the "Meridian Evolution" a visionless ATM-based PBX. After the bought, Bay had a IP-PBX project based on VoIP cards on routers and standard server-based call processing. That project was killed in favor of the CS1000, just to favor the same visionless guys that failed miserably with the Meridian Evolution

Just for correctness....the Bay project was killed in favor of BCM not the CS1000. The CS1000 came a number of years later

Meridian Evolution was a technology boondoggle of massive proportions, conceived and not delivered in the old MountainView lab (ultimately caused the demise of the lab and the integration into Santa Clara - justifyably so). Funny thing is that it was Roth who finally personally killed it.

In my opinion, the failure of the Bay Acquisition was not a simple on. Many factors that drove a very complex disaster. Bay was not necessarily the shining star that many let on - there were battles between the old East and West Coast teams (created by a previous merger), Cisco was moving ahead in routing, marketing, etc. Northern Telecom was, well, Northern Telecom with its own culture and process. Unfortunately, creating a "two headed monster" with House and Long "joined at the wallet" was an exercise in compromise and being nice. Unfortunately, it was many years and leaders before integration really started to happen. By the time it got to a point where it could be managed as one Enterprise unit (many years later) Cisco was way out in front and the value of Bay became a few products, some key people and a lot of talk of the "good old days".

Roth oversaw it, as did Dunn during the critical period so they are accountable. Reality is the lousy execution was a layer (and two) down.

If my memory is not wrong (I am not 100% sure), at launching there were 3 InCA (means Internet Communications Architecture) products:

InCA 1000: was the Bay product. Windows server and router voIP cards.

InCA 1000M: was the Meridian derivative.

InCA 6500M: was a Matra France derivative.

The three of them were later renamed as Succession, the Bay project was cancelled and the Matra goes out when they sold the unit to EADS. The only real product at launch was the 6500, the Bay never take off because was loosing support internally and the Succession 1000M (now CS1000) has been resisting to loose its telecom DNA until recently (I can say the first real IP centric release has been the recently launched 6.0 which is 100% SIP based).
If you want a story of poor execution this is one: a 1999 product launch only fulfill the marketing promises after 10 years and when the company is in Ch11...

Sadly, INCA was in reality more of a marketing response than technology. There was never any "INCA" (imagine naming your line a race of people that died because the couldnt adapt) or Succession (Carrier branding forced onto Enterprise) product that was a real, viable IP based product. The INCA 1000 suffered from NT and lack of features, the 1000M was limited as it was based on the Opt 11 and 6500 was a Frecnh scam. They were based on existing TDM platforms. The BCM came and replaced the Bay.

Many turns in the internal politics and platforms, but a common theme - after the debacle of Meridian Evolution, there wasnt another new "big project" voice platform started in Enterprise. Every product camp entrenched their installed base and eventually the two large installed bases won - Norstar (BCM) and M1 (CS1k). CS2K emerged as the solution for the large space, evolving off the SL-100 base. All else, including the MCS (another technically interesting but commercially unviable platform) never really got off the ground.

Product specifics aside, the real failure was the ability to make the hard calls on organization, leadership and product lines. Continuing to drive mulitple platforms was a curse all of Nortel suffered from and Enterprise was afflicted as well. Cisco didnt suffer - they bought one (that Nortel looked at but was outbid for), lived with the shortcomings and used a longer term plan with stable funding/support and strong marketing sales to take market leadership. And now, Microsoft is taking the same approach - patience, reasonable expectations and strong marketing. The world has moved on.

Agree in almost everything but: "imagine naming your line a race of people that died because the couldnt adapt"

The Inca race is well alive in millions of people around the world.

Inca civilization was exterminated by Spanish Conquers and Catholic Church. It was not a problem of darwinian adaptation but genocide.

By the way, Peruvians were not happy at all at Inca launch...

Ahh - Inca. Now, finally with Secure Router Nortel is delivering what they started in 1999. 10 years of messing around.

Bay Networks was in process of trying to acquire Selsius in 1998, Cisco took them away due to ...........Nortel confusion. Selsius, to the best of my knowledge became the basis of Call Manager Express.

You got it!